Observing the Pragmatist

n addition to those two points, I want to defend my solution to the problem of posed by doubting the world: Pragmatists typically reject the idea that they are making any kind of leap. (If I can guess their temperment, many of those reading this wonder why I would spend any time looking at a conclusion that is too trivial to invite discussion.)

On this page, I want to discuss:

1. The typical pragmatist and I make similar conclusions on similar data.
2. What the typical pragmatist misses in his or her resolution.
3. What the resolution implies about their model of reality.

Observation on Pragmatic Thinkers

ragmatists see the same futility in the meaninglessness of phantasmic, solipsistic world as I do. However, they do not want to tackle the question of meaninglessness. Indeed, they seem to want to put as much distance as they can between themselves and that question as fast as possible.

The claim that the world is rational is never born out by their methods. If it were, they would take out pencil and paper, roll up their sleeves, and prove the outside world. But it is my experience that rationalists never even attempt this. And should you put them to the task, they will claim that you are being unsensible in opposition. “Be sensible!” said Rudolph Carnap, when faced with a chair vanishing behind his back.

I cannot avoid the implication that pragmatism immediately takes the emphasis off of theory—in fact, it even pulls back the reins on the imagination that might wander off into the academic fog. It redirects it toward an end. It pulls us away from foolishness, owing to the lack of value in acting foolish.

Foolishness opposes the very values (and I call them moral) that I indicated in Phenomenology: purpose, utility, and reason. You can have a purpose, but if we are foolish, we injure or neglect that purpose. Foolishness, by definition has no utility. Foolishness does not listen to Reason. Moreover, it impairs or clouds it. That is why it is my desire to not be foolish.

So I end up exactly where the rationalists do. Except, I simply tell you when I've taken the turn. To inform you, on even ground that I have not proven the outside world exists. You have the freedom to pursue the possibility of a lack of the outside world. Don’t let me— however insistent a figment I am—stop you.

I simply explain to you that I have found no value in it. But because I come to the same resolution that they do, it gives me the confidence to say that neither of us have proven anything, and we all are going to look at you funny when you tell us we do not exist (provided that the others really do exist).

The one thing you can rest assured is that I am not like those magicians who then question “What is purpose?”. And I will definitely not argue, after reining you to prudent ends, that there are no ends—or that ends are meaningless.

I believe that I should defer to Carnap’s inestimable intuition here: “Be sensible!”

The Moral of the Story

was going to leave it at that, but I never can. I’m always scanning my writings, re-reading them—often to bask in pride. Yet, my apparent weakness can also show my pursuit of excellence. What hampers the speed of my writing is the many connections that I make between all the thoughts I’m putting on a page. I just sometimes miss connections that were there, because in writing my thoughts linearly I follow a path from one thought-node to another, forgetting the other paths.

Hunh?

Well, in this case, I reread this piece (initially a side bar on my Phenomenology essay) and I figured out that the gap, and the pragmatists’ resolution, illustrate a point about how we view of the world.

As I said, the naturalists make this argument all the time: that I alone exist does not make any sense therefore the logical alternative is to insist on what is before my eyes.

As I said, they make this leap without looking down at the jump. They insist there is a logical necessity in making this leap—in fact, those of you who think this way probably see nothing but frivolity in my trying to expand and examine this link. But I challenge you to think about what you are implying with this switch.

The meaninglessness of solipsism only disqualifies it, if we require meaning. The shift is only made necessary if meaning is a necessary fact.

Meaning Less

othing would be any the worse, if solipsism was meaningless and there was no meaning. Not even to what you think these words are saying to you, or the concepts you think that I’m relating. In fact, the denial of meaning, puts things into such a muddle that we have no necessary outcomes of anything. There are no requirements, because there are no sure connections between things that we can say anything requires anything.

In fact, solipsism is the absolute denial of meaning. It is meaningless at base. Therefore when solipsism says, perhaps nothing is meaningful and everything is a phantasm, it is senseless to say, “yes, but that is meaningless”. That is attendant to the model.

It’s kind of like objecting to Koeppler’s system of elliptical orbits because they orbits are not round. Yes, that is entirely the point.

“Aha!” the rationalist says. “Were that to make sense, I could not understand it! Or at least whatever I understood would not be what you intended”

Actually, you only have a sensation of understanding, this would be consistant with your idea that meaning is anything. For example, if you didn’t think you had experienced meaning, why were you using the word? Why did it seem to be a concept to you? Therefore, you are only verifying that you have a notion of meaning. I did not say that you didn’s have a cluster of perceptions that you named “meaning” or “rational thought”, I just said, your perception that it is something, cannot be proved without assuming that it is something. You must use a circular argument.

Just like solipsism allows for the complex of sensory impressions which make up your experience of me (there’s no actual me writing this) or your sensory impressons of the lamp in your living room, it allows for the impression of meaning, whether or not there is such a thing. What solipsism denies is that it is anything more than a perception.

So everything that I, the cluster, say that you agree with or find fault with is attended by a notion of insight—as well as everything you tie these observations to, suggests meaning and intelligibility.

These words, this page, your perception of these words, and your need to reject that model, is nothing more than the attendant delusions of the state that you are in. And even what you are making these words say to you make no absolute sense.

“BUT THAT MAKES NO SENSE!!” you tell me.

Isn’t that precisely what I’ve been saying! Must you simply spin your wheels?!?!

A Sense of Nonsense

gain, it is not logical to raise the claim itself as it’s own objection. But since the counter idea, requires that nothing has meaning, we“ve hamstrung ourselves to reconstruct it.

We reach an impasse. We can ask “Who cares about logic, if nothing is meaningful? Isn’t logic itself an extention of the idea of meaning? But all you’ve done is throw out the value of logic with meaning, you haven’t brought meaning back into play. You’re just spreading the poison.

Perhaps you’re saying, that I couldn't be using logic. You’re as right as you can be. Number one, I don’t exist. Number two, I’m not using it. There’s no such thing. You’re only classifying my statements as logical to fit into the whole notion of meaning, that you are trying to leap to.

Again, I never said that things didn’t seem to mean things to you. I just said, that is your perception.

I said in my essay that there is nothing we can do from this position. That implies that “doing” is anything. You said that it does not make sense, that implies that “sense” is anything.

You see we can only disqualify things that are meaningless, if meaning is necessary. Rationalists are really making the case that it is.

We have no evidence for meaning. Were we to disbelieve meaning until we were presented with evidence, there would be no rules of evidence, and therefore nothing to construct meaning with.

Meaning is implied in discourse. It does not make it anymore of an actual fact, but it is one of the basic assumptions about what we are trying to do. That is why any one of us reacts to things that make no sense’even viscerally as I, in my rationalist clothes do. We intimately believe in meaning.

So we start with a predisposition to meaning and action (the “doing” I spoke about before.) and our leap to the bedrock is an exercise of following that belief. I call it a moral choice.

I submit a sort of Pascal’s Wager on Solipsism and Meaninglessness. If nothing means anything, I can do anything and fail to be wrong as I understand it from a meaning-ist perspective. I cannot fail, therefore, I cannot fail for believing in meaning and reason, it’s a simple affectation of my orientation in regard to meaninglessness.

If however, this is view is wrong, then I can do myself great harm by believing it. If I must go through the experience of eating in order to continue to perceive, then not going through the motions to bring me to that experience, threatens my survival.

Even in this, I’ve framed this from a meaning-ist perspective. Failure is nothing without meaning. I still cannot fail, because it is nothing. But the word is only a notion of what is happening otherwise, and another garnish on our persistant delusion of things mattering—of structure, of order, of sense.